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Balancing the Goals of Health Care Provision
Martin Feldstein
*
A desirable system for providing and financing health care would 
achieve three goals: (1) preventing the deprivation of care because of a patient’s
inability to pay; (2) avoiding wasteful spending; and (3) allowing care to reflect the
different tastes of individual patients. In practice, however, it is not possible to
realize fully all three of these goals.  There are tradeoffs among them, as there
generally are in every aspect of life. We can achieve one goal  more fully only by a
less complete achievement of one or both of the others. 
But these goals should condition and inform the design of a good system for
financing health care.  In this paper, I will discuss the application of these goals in
more detail and use them to consider a reform of the system of Health Savings
Accounts that was enacted as part of the 2003 Medicare legislation and, separately, 
the challenge posed by the very expensive treatments for rare diseases that are
becoming more common.
The ability of insurance to reduce the financial  risk that individuals face-2-
while at the same time it increases the total cost of health care is central to the
conflict among these three goals.   Although most families consume a relatively
small amount of health services in a typical year, a small fraction of families
experience one or more spells in hospital and therefore consume very expensive
health care.  For most such individuals, the high cost of health care cannot be
predicted in advance.  This leads to the use of insurance to finance such bills. 
An important feature of insurance is that it drives a wedge between the cost
of producing care and the cost to the patient at the time that care is rendered.  Since
insurance means that patients generally pay only a small fraction of the cost of the
care at the time that they receive the care, patients naturally want a substantially 
higher level of spending than they would if they were not insured.  This is true even
for moderate health events and for affluent individuals.  Insurance raises health
care spending not because it makes it possible for people to pay large health care
bills (although it does that) but because it reduces the cost of health services
relative to other goods and services that individuals consume.
So the widespread use of insurance is desirable because of the financial 
risks that result from the inherently skewed distribution of total costs per patient.
But insurance is also damaging because it leads patients and their doctors to choose
excessive levels of care, i.e., to increase spending to a level at which the last-3-
dollars’ worth of care costs substantially more to produce than the value of that
care to the patient’s health.  It is natural therefore to ask: What design of health 
insurance would best balance these two effects?
The finance of health care is also complicated by the fact that many people
now have no health insurance. Because we as a society do not want people to go
without care because they cannot afford to pay for it, the government steps in to
provide free care for large groups of the population and to subsidize insurance for
many others.  What form should that government intervention take in light of the
three goals?  
A new problem for health care finance is emerging because of the
breakthroughs in pharmacology and biogenetics.  The resulting new drugs make it
possible,  but sometimes very expensive,  to treat some diseases that were
previously not treatable or not treatable with as high a probability of success. 
Should private insurance cover such expensive treatments?  Should such coverage
be mandatory?   If it is not, should the government pay the bill? 
Preventing the deprivation of care
The goal of preventing the deprivation of care because of an inability to pay
does not mean that care must be free for all.  Although free care would achieve that-4-
goal, it would conflict strongly with the goal of avoiding wasteful spending.
Fortunately, most people can pay for small and medium size health bills
without any financial stress.  It is the very large bills that can be a barrier to care for
many people and a serious financial burden.  That’s why health insurance –
especially some form of major risk insurance – makes sense.
Even the extremely expensive care for some forms of cancer and certain
other diseases that have been made possible by new forms of drug therapy is
sufficiently rare that the insurance premiums required to pay for  the actuarially
expected cost of such care is not likely to be large relative to individuals’ incomes.
A treatment that costs $100,000 but that is medically useful for only one person in
100,000 per year only increases the actuarial cost and therefore the needed
insurance premium by one dollar per person per year.  Such high costs of treatment
appear in news stories when the individual’s insurance policy does not cover these
expenses,  despite the low actuarial cost of doing so.
Pharmaceutical research is, of course,  likely to increase the number of
diseases that can be treated effectively but at high expense, adding to these
actuarial costs.  But at the same time pharmaceutical research is working on
developing ways of identifying which patients can benefit from each type of
treatment.  These developments in targeted pharmacology will reduce the number-5-
of ineffective  treatments and will thus reduce the cost of insurance. Targeted
pharmacology should also reduce the cost of drug development (by reducing the
sizes of the samples needed to prove efficacy), thus lowering the cost of the drugs
themselves.
But there will inevitably be treatments that are very expensive and yet have a
low probability of success.  Avoiding deprivation of care because of an inability to
pay does not mean providing every possible treatment, regardless of how low the
probability of success.  At a certain point, we would all agree that level of cost of
such treatment would violate the second goal of avoiding wasteful spending. 
Moreover, individuals differ in their willingness to pay through insurance for
treatments that have a very low probability of success, even if the incremental
premium is relatively low. That’s why it is important to allow care to reflect
differences among individuals in preferences, a subject to which I will return
below. 
Avoiding Wasteful Spending
Before doing so, I turn to the important goal of avoiding wasteful spending. 
There is widespread concern about the fact that health care spending has increased
much more rapidly than GDP or personal incomes.  It is important, however, to-6-
recognize that this rise in health care spending is not the same as an increase in the
price of health care.  The important difference is that the rise in spending is on new
types of care rather than higher prices for the old type of care.  Treatments have
changed and become more effective.  For many conditions, the cost of effective
treatment has actually gone down because treatments are now more likely to be
successful or because hospitalization has become unnecessary or because hospital
stays have shortened.  And even for those conditions for which the cost of success
has gone up, I would much rather be a patient now than 10 or 20 years ago.
Estimates by my Harvard colleague  David Cutler and others indicate that the
value of the improved health over the past several decades has exceeded the
increased cost of health care.  But while that is true for the overall cost of care,  it is
not likely to be true for incremental care at the margin.  There have been
inframarginal gains in health and in the efficacy of  health care but the structure of
current insurance means that at the margin we are undoubtedly spending more for
care than the value to patients of the resulting health improvements. 
If patients and their doctors increase spending until the value to the patient of
the “last dollar” of that care is equal to the additional net cost to the patient at the
time of that care – i.e., to the cost net of insurance – then the system is providing
care that,  at the margin,  costs a dollar but is valued by the patient at only (say) 20* I proposed such a form of insurance in “xxxxxxxxxxxxxx,” The Public Interest, xxxx
19xx.  Jonathan Gruber and I examined such a plan in “A New Approach to National Health
Insurance,” The Public Interest, Spring 1971.  Jonathan Gruber and I examined such a plan
empirically in Martin Feldstein and Jonathan Gruber, “A Major Risk Approach to Health
Insurance Reform,” in Tax Policy and the Economy, James Poterba (ed.) (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1995)
-7-
cents or whatever the coinsurance rate may be.  When physicians are required by
insurance rules or HMO regulations to choose a standard of care that more closely
reflects the total cost of the incremental unit of care,  they create frustrated patients
who feel (correctly) that they are being denied care that could help them.
What is the solution to this problem?  Part of the solution is some form of
major risk insurance in which patients have a large deductible or high coinsurance
rate.
*  A deductible of $5,000 – which is less than 10 percent of median  family
cash income – would leave most families paying for all of their health care out of
pocket with no insurance reimbursement.  Their decisions about the desired
standard of care would therefore not be distorted by insurance.  And while no one
would welcome a medical bill for the year as large as $5,000, most families would
also not be deprived of care by an inability to pay since  their maximum annual
payment under the deductible would be less than 10 percent of family income.  
The same principle would lead to lower deductibles for families with lower
incomes. Special rules could apply to preventive measures that are shown to be
cost-effective or to procedures that reduce contagious diseases.-8-
But a significant fraction of families – and a much larger fraction of health
care spending – would exceed a $5,000 deductible.  With no out of pocket payment
above that level, or only a modest coinsurance rate, there would be both wasteful
spending and, to the extent that physicians restrict what patients would  otherwise
want, patient frustration as well.
Raising the deductible to, say, $10,000 would reduce the problem of
wasteful spending but would clearly create a substantial  financial burden for many
households and a barrier to appropriate care for some.  
The goals of limiting wasteful spending and preventing the deprivation of
care because of a financial burden might be better served by replacing the
deductible with a high coinsurance rate.  For example, instead of a $5,000
deductible, the insurance policy might take the form of a 50 percent coinsurance
rate on the first $10,000 of spending.  Patients would still be protected against
paying more than $5,000 out of pocket.  But with a 50 percent coinsurance rate on
$10,000 of spending, there would be fewer patients and fewer dollars that face no
out of pocket cost.
A constant 50 percent coinsurance rate on the first $10,000 of costs may not
be the best structure for the insurance policy.  Determining that requires more
analysis than I have done.  It would depend on the distribution of potential-9-
spending levels, the sensitivity of spending to different coinsurance rates, and the
value that individuals place on limiting their out of  pocket cost of health care.  In
principle, the optimal policy might involve a combination of deductibles and
different coinsurance rates for different ranges of spending.  The deductibles and
coinsurance rates  might also be related to the income of the family.
Health Saving Accounts
There is a lesson in this for the possible reform of Health Savings Accounts. 
I am an enthusiastic supporter of the Health Saving Account principle.  I think
however that it could be improved significantly and that failure to improve it might
lead to its eventual rejection by the political process
The rules creating the Health Saving Account program were enacted as part
of the 2003 Medicare legislation.  A Health Saving Account is similar to an IRA or
401(k) in that funds are deposited out of pretax income (by the individual or a
combination of the individual and his or her employer) and enjoy the advantage
that the income of the account (interest, dividends and capital gains) accumulates
tax free.  Even better than an IRA or 401(k) account, the funds that are withdrawn
from a Health Saving Account to pay for health care broadly defined are never*The HSA rule is therefore different from the earlier Medical Saving Accounts in which
funds not spent within the year are not carried forward but are kept by the employer.  Since there
is no carry forward, there is no investment in Medical Saving Accounts.
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subject to tax.  The balance in the fund is carried forward just as an IRA would be.
* 
The amount of money that can be deposited in a Health Saving Account each
year is equal to the size of the deductible in a major risk insurance policy that the
individual chooses, up to a maximum in 2006 of $5,450.  The policy must also
provide protection by setting a maximum out of pocket amount that is incurred by
coinsurance payments above the deductible. For 2006, this maximum out of pocket
amount for a couple is $10,200.  A typical HSA policy might have a $5,000
deductible and then a 20 percent copay until the total out of pocket spending
reaches (say) $10,000.
The tax advantage of the HSA account thus provides a strong incentive for
individuals and employers to shift away from the current common type of health
insurance policy with a low deductible and low coinsurance rate.  Such traditional
policies substantially distort the choice of care but provide a very significant tax
benefit to the individual. The HSA option provides an opportunity to enjoy a
similar or larger tax advantage by buying an alternative form of health insurance
that provides financial protection while reducing the incentives that lead to
wasteful spending.  Individuals could use the HSA balances to spread their-11-
uninsured expenses (i.e., the  expenses up to the deductible amount plus the
coinsurance payments up to the maximum out of pocket limit)  over time or they
could treat their HSA as a type of IRA, paying the uninsured expenses out of
pocket, and enjoying the maximum tax free accumulation of funds.  
There are however two problems with the HSA legislation in its current
form.  First, the $5,450 maximum deductible will leave far too many dollars of
health spending without an effective restraint.  As I noted above, it would be more
effective in controlling costs to have a 50 percent coinsurance rate on $11,000. 
Other combinations might be even better but a 50 percent coinsurance rate on
$11,000 is easy to understand.  
The HSA approach will only succeed if individuals find it attractive.  For
lower income families, the risk of a $5,450 deductible (or of out of pocket
payments of  50 percent on the first $11,000 of health spending) might be larger
than they are willing to accept. Under the HSA rules, such a family could select a
policy with a lower deductible and put less money into their Health Saving
Account.  A family with an income of $30,000 could decide to have a deductible of
only $3,300 and therefore put only $3300 into their HSA (including their
employer’s contribution). With a deductible of only $3,300 such a family would be
even more likely to spend above the deductible amount, removing any effective-12-
discipline on such spending.  It would be better to allow such a family to deposit
$3,300 to an HSA if they have a policy with a  30 percent coinsurance rate on
$11,000 of spending.  Although there must be a lower limit on the coinsurance rate
to make sure that it has a favorable incentive effect, a 100 percent coinsurance rate
(i.e., a deductible) on a low amount is certainly wrong.
The second problem with the HSA legislation in its current form is suggested
by the fact that hospitals all across the country are experiencing a significant
volume of bad debts caused by patients who do not pay their hospital bills after
receiving care.  This is particularly true for uninsured patients, but it is also true 
for insured patients who do not pay the coinsurance and deductibles called for by
their policies.
Such nonpayments could become much more severe with Health Saving
Accounts.  An individual with a $5,000 deductible may not have cash on hand to
pay the bill when he is discharged from the hospital.  While many individuals
would accept the obligation and pay the bill promptly after that, perhaps by
drawing on their Health Saving Account, others may simply put off payment and
eventually not pay.  
The advantage of the out of pocket payment as a discipline on excessive
spending would of course be lost if individuals simply do not pay the deductible or-13-
copayment.  The impact on the financial soundness of hospitals of not collecting
the first $5,000 of each hospital bill would  be very serious. 
One simple remedy for this would be to allow hospitals (and other health
care providers) to have easy access to the HSA balances of individuals who have
not paid within (say) three months of the time of care. This might be arranged
through the insurance provider or by using an HSA  debit card as collateral at the
time of care.  It is important to the attractiveness of the HSA system to allow
individuals the choice of paying out of pocket if they prefer rather than from their
HSA account.  But easy access to the HSA accounts by providers without the usual
legal procedure of collecting bad debts would be desirable in itself and a strong
incentive for individuals to pay their bills.
Allowing Health Care to Reflect the Different Tastes of Individual Patients.
It was not too many years ago that a physician could make decisions about
medical care by asking himself what would produce the very best health outcome
for his patient.  Economists, myself included, argued that that was not good enough
and that doctors should   take the cost of care into account, performing an implicit
cost-benefit analysis to decide what care was appropriate. The rise in the cost of
care, especially the cost of hospital inpatient care, brought about that change in-14-
physicians’ thinking. Under pressure from hospital administrators and  insurance
companies,  doctors developed protocols of appropriate care that reflected costs as
well as outcomes.
Unfortunately, this approach has generally led to “one size fits all” medicine. 
A doctor generally prescribes the same treatment for demographically similar
patients who have a particular disease or who present with particular symptoms. 
Of course, doctors differ in their perception of the efficacy of different treatments
or diagnostic procedures and that leads to different behavior among different
doctors.  But, with certain important exceptions,  the preferences of the patients do
not play a significant role in this process.  Those exceptions, for example the
treatment of prostate cancer or breast cancer, are generally about balancing risks
and other outcome measures and not balancing costs and outcomes.
And yet for every other kind of  good or service, we assume that an
important function of the market is to reflect differences in consumers’ preferences. 
Of course, everyone wants good health.  But some are more willing to make greater
sacrifices to achieve that good health than others.  This is not just a question of
money or ability to pay.  We all know that health is hurt by smoking, by being
overweight, and by not exercising.  And yet millions of Americans smoke, are
overweight, and do not exercise.  These habits may be hard to change but millions-15-
have changed them.  So addiction is not an excuse. It seems reasonable to conclude
that some  individuals enjoy smoking enough to accept the potentially adverse
long-term health effects.  Ditto for food.  And for not exerting themselves.
We should not be surprised therefore if taste differences about health also
imply that some individuals are willing to pay more in order to get better health
outcomes.  This may involve paying more for more complete routine checkups, or
for more complete diagnostic examinations when there are symptoms, or for more
expensive care of adverse medical conditions (either at the time of care or in the
choice of a particular insurance policy or HMO plan.).  
How does this fit with the other goals of health care provision – preventing
the deprivation of care and avoiding wasteful spending?  For patients whose
spending is within a deductible limit, there is no conflict.  If their physician and
hospital are willing, they can buy whatever  they want and are willing to pay for.  It
would certainly be a mistake to prevent them from doing so.  
An advantage of the high coinsurance rate is that individuals can indicate
their preference by willingness to pay.  They may of course be paying only 50 cents
to buy care that costs a dollar to produce, suggesting that it would be appropriate
for the provider to exercise  some restraint on what they buy.  But reflecting
individual preferences implies that should not be done to the point where all-16-
individuals are forced to accept the same care.
The problem is more difficult when the coinsurance rate is at a low level or
when the patient is not paying at all.  Under those circumstances, there is no way to
know patient’s preferences and the physician and institutional provider must
determine what the patient gets. But that should be seen as an undesirable outcome,
denying patients and their physicians the opportunity to adjust care to different
preferences.  That suggests that it would be desirable to design the financing
system to avoid such situations.  That might involve, for example, arrangements in
which patients express their preferences by the type of coverage they select or the
style of the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) that they join.  Even if they
are not paying out of pocket at the time of care, they can express a desire for more
complete preventive care or diagnostic exams or form of treatment by the selection
among  different policies or different HMOs.  
This could  also be the framework for solving  the problem of the very
expensive treatments that are now becoming possible.    There are some treatments
that physicians (and patients if they knew enough) would agree should always be
done even though they are very expensive because they produce favorable
outcomes with high enough probability relative to the cost of the treatment.  Unless
such treatments are required to be part of every standard health insurance policy (or-17-
are covered by a government catastrophic risk plan), there would be a temptation
for some individuals to reduce their insurance premiums by selecting  insurance
without such coverage in the knowledge that society would pay for the care if they
met the medical conditions.  Those are the policies that generate the news stories
now about “impossibly expensive” forms of care.
But for those treatments that are more questionable – offering lower
probabilities of success or only small increases in life expectancy in exchange for
very large costs – individuals could have the discretion in advance when they buy
insurance or choose an HMO plan. Just as some insurance  plans now include a
wider range of drugs than other plans, the same could be applied to the very
expensive treatments for various diseases.  How this is to be done in practice and
what its consequences are for the cost of care remain an important challenge for the
future.
Conclusion
In summary, the design of health care financing involves balancing three
goals: preventing the deprivation of care, avoiding wasteful spending, and allowing
care to reflect the different tastes of individual patients. The trade-offs among these
three goals is changing as the cost and potency of care increases.
The system of Health Saving Accounts provides a new framework within-18-
which to balance these goals but requires modification if it is to strengthen
incentives and avoid increasing the bad debt problem of hospitals and doctors. 
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